My answers to the CWG-IANA questions

[Seun Ojedeji]

Hello Milton,

Thanks for your mail, kindly find my response inline

On Tue, Feb 10, 2015 at 4:15 PM, Milton L Mueller <mueller at syr.edu> wrote:

>  Dear members:
>
> The CWG on IANA transition is going to collecting community feedback on
> the IANA transition this week. This exercise is very important because it
> will influence the CWG’s development of a proposal.
>
> I have gone through the 9 questions they prepared and answered them, you
> all may be interested in my answers. Most of these answers will probably be
> uncontroversial on this list, but there may be some room for debate so  I
> would like to get your feedback on my proposed answers
>
>
>
> 1.      Do you believe that the transition from the NTIA should happen
> (Please provide the reasons for your answer)?
>
> Yes. Unilateral US government control of the IANA functions contract is
> not compatible with the multistakeholder model
>

I agree


>
>
> 2.      Are you comfortable with ICANN as policy-maker also being the
> IANA operator without the benefit of external oversight?
>
> No.
>

I will suggest we don't put an outright NO to this. I suggest the following
as a response to question 2:

This depends on whether there can be adequate accountability mechanism that
empowers the policy making body community to be involved in the decision
making making process that will affect their respective functions of IANA.


>
> 3.      Should registries, as the primary customers of the IANA
> functions, have more of a say as to which transition proposal is
> acceptable?
>
> The NTIA has made it clear that all major stakeholder groups, including
> registries, need to accept the transition proposal. Registries should have
> an influential role in any oversight mechanisms of the naming-related IANA
> functions, but need not have a privileged role in the selection of
> proposals.
>
>
>
I agree

>  4.      What does functional separation of IANA from ICANN mean to you?
> (this is not referring to having another operator than ICANN performing the
> IANA functions but rather the internal separation between ICANN and IANA in
> the context where ICANN is the IANA operator)
>
> Functional separation means that IANA is a department of ICANN under the
> same management as the rest of ICANN and without a clearly separated budget
> or mission.
>
>
>
I agree to the intent but will rephrase as below:

Functional separation means that IANA is a department of ICANN under the
same management as the rest of ICANN and with a clearly specified budget.

>  5.      Do you believe the IANA function is adequately separated from
> ICANN under the current arrangements (internal separation)?
>
> No.
>

I agree to the intent but will rephrase as below:

No only as it affects the budgeting side.


>
>
> 6.      In considering the key factors (such as security and stability,
> ease of separating the IANA function from ICANN, quality of services,
> accountability mechanisms etc.) for evaluating the various transition
> proposals what importance would you give to the ability to separate IANA
> from ICANN (separability) vs. the other factors?
>
> Very high importance, because separability will have major beneficial
> effects on all the other factors, such as accountability, quality of
> service, security and stability. Separability increases the leverage of the
> customers of IANA over performance, security and stability.
>
>
>
>
>
> 7.            Given the IANA functions could be separated from ICANN do
> you believe it would be important for the community to obtain from ICANN on
> an annual basis the costs for operating IANA including overhead costs?
>
>
>
> Yes, very important.
>
>  o Would it be important to separate out the costs associated with
> address and protocol functions?
>
>
>
> Less so than the IANA department as a whole
>

I agree


>
> 8.            Could there be unforeseen impacts relative to selecting a
> new operator for the IANA functions vs the ICANN policy role (should ICANN
> determine that there will be another round of new gTLDs, how could it
> ensure that the new operator would accept this)?
>
>
>
> No, a new operator could be contractually bound to accept changes from
> ICANN that were the product of legitimate policy making processes.
>

Suggest below:

Yes, however one possible way to reduce such posibilities is by having the
new operator contractually bound to accept changes from ICANN that were the
product of legitimate policy making processes.


>
>
> 9.            Are there other transition models which the CWG should be
> exploring?
>
>
>
> Yes, the new structural separation model proposed by Brenden Kuerbis, Matt
> Shears, and Avri Doria
>

 I have not seen that proposal so i have no view about this (acknowledge
that i was not at the F2F meeting of the NCSG so maybe thats where it was
introduced).

Regards

>
>
>
>
> Milton L Mueller
>
> Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor
>
> Syracuse University School of Information Studies
>
> http://faculty.ischool.syr.edu/mueller/
>
> Internet Governance Project
>
> http://internetgovernance.org
>
>
>



-- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------





*Seun Ojedeji,Federal University Oye-Ekitiweb:      http://www.fuoye.edu.ng
<http://www.fuoye.edu.ng> Mobile: +2348035233535**alt email:
<http://goog_1872880453>seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng
<seun.ojedeji at fuoye.edu.ng>*

The key to understanding is humility - my view !
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