[NCSG-PC] Review NCSG Comment on KSK Rollover Draft

[Ayden Férdeline]

Another thought:

The proposed roll over date is a Thursday in the evening (US), which is Friday in many parts of the world. If something went wrong, Friday may be an inopportune time for this to happen. Might it be better for the rollover, whenever it does occur, to happen on a Monday?

Ayden

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On 26 March 2018 2:46 PM, Renata Aquino Ribeiro <raquino at gmail.com> wrote:

> [observer]
>
> Hi
>
> I agree governmental actors should not really be the ones with this discussion in mind.
>
> This is a hot topic in RIRs
> LACNIC tour to ICANN in Vice News being case in point
> https://lists.ncuc.org/pipermail/ncuc-discuss/2018-March/043809.html
>
> Outreach to endpoints of industry chain is the best way to deal with the theme and is well covered by the comment.
>
> Best,
>
> Renata
>
> On Sun, Mar 25, 2018 at 9:03 PM, Rafik Dammak <rafik.dammak at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Hi Ayden,
>>
>> Thank for those questions and review, looking for other PC members to do so.
>> maybe something we can check with the draft team as they reviewed the material?
>> I am not security expert but my understanding that risks depend on the threat model for this case.
>> for outreach, ICANN did, in fact, contact government regulators and relevant authorities to share info with their local operators for the first iteration to inform them about KSK rollover. tbh I won't count on GAC to do such thing. Of course, more can be done but it is always challenging.
>> I guess a monthly report may or not be used by users but at least can be a good transparency tool, identifying operators and can be used by the technical community itself not edn-users.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Rafik
>>
>> 2018-03-25 6:10 GMT+09:00 Ayden Férdeline <icann at ferdeline.com>:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> Thanks to those who drafted this.
>>>
>>> From what I understand, delaying the now overdue KSK rollover yet again would increase the risk of key compromise. Security best practices suggest that ICANN should rollover the key on a regular basis. Are there any dangers to us supporting another postponement?
>>>
>>> I think our recommendation that the publication of a "monthly trust anchor report will give those Internet users who identify their local operators as “not ready” an opportunity to reach out to them directly prior to the root KSK rollover date" is far-fetched. I doubt any end-users will read it and take action. I believe the onus should be on ICANN (and possibly the GAC) to reach out to local operators who are not ready...
>>>
>>> Best wishes,
>>>
>>> Ayden
>>>
>>> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
>>> On 21 March 2018 6:28 PM, Rafik Dammak <rafik.dammak at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> A draft we have to review for endorsment  asap,  the deadline for submission is the 2nd April.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Rafik
>>>>
>>>> ---------- Forwarded message ---------
>>>> From: Louise Marie Hurel <louise.marie.hsd at gmail.com>
>>>> Date: Thu, Mar 22, 2018, 3:23 AM
>>>> Subject: [Public Comments] NCSG Comment on KSK Rollover Draft
>>>> To: <NCSG-DISCUSS at listserv.syr.edu>
>>>> Cc: Tomslin Samme-Nlar <mesumbeslin at gmail.com>, Dina Solveig Jalkanen <icann at thomascovenant.org>, Rafik Dammak <rafik.dammak at gmail.com>
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> Comments on the Plan to Restart the Root Key Signing Key (KSK) Rollover Process opened early February [this year](https://www.icann.org/public-comments/ksk-rollover-restart-2018-02-01-en). For those who have not been following the process that closely, KSK serves as a trust anchor for DNSSEC and was last (and for the first time) signed in 2010. ICANN had scheduled to implement a new key in October. However, they decided to postpone the signing of new cryptographic keys for the DNS after finding that the resolvers used by ISPs and network operators were still not ready and there's a need for more data in prepping for it.
>>>> While the comment is narrow and highly technical in its scope, the overall idea of the process can be read as taking the next step in consolidating a way of periodically changing keys -- thus enhancing security and resilience in the DNS.
>>>>
>>>> Tomslin, Dina and I have worked on [this draft](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1VNxn4UJlk8z196Kz56ucAdgyWp0ua9NmdHexRE1Wkhc/edit) and would be happy to get more comments edits, suggestions on this. Feel free to jump in.
>>>>
>>>> For more info, see [here](https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2017-09-27-en) and [here](https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/plan-continuing-root-ksk-rollover-01feb18-en.pdf).
>>>> All the best,
>>>>
>>>> Louise Marie Hurel
>>>>
>>>> Cybersecurity Project Coordinator | Igarapé Institute
>>>>
>>>> London School of Economics (LSE) Media and Communications (Data and Society)
>>>>
>>>> Skype: louise.dias
>>>> [+44 (0) 7468 906327](tel:+44%207468%20906327)
>>>> l.h.dias at lse.ac.uk
>>>> louise.marie.hsd at gmail.com
>>
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