[Ncsg-discuss] PIR and Autistici/Inventati
Ephraim Percy Kenyanito
0000212d39ab1a6b-dmarc-request at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
Tue Sep 8 18:21:03 EEST 2026
Hi all,
In addition to the points already raised, it is worth recalling that in
2020, PIR previously engaged with ARTICLE 19 and the Danish Institute for
Human Rights (DIHR) to conduct a human rights impact assessment (HRIA) and
gap analysis based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (UNGPs). That work, which took place in February 2020, emphasised
the necessity of proactive human rights due diligence,
human-rights-by-design frameworks, clear procedures for third-party and
government requests, explicit policy commitments to international human
rights standards, and robust access to remedy and transparency mechanisms.
Regarding the recent enforcement actions, the US government sanctioned the
Italian volunteer-run activist provider Autistici/Inventati (A/I) on August
26, 2026, for allegedly providing services to terrorist organisations.
While the designation provided a wind-down period until September 25, 2026,
the domain autistici.org was immediately placed on serverHold. It has since
been confirmed that Identity Digital, acting as the Registry Service
Provider, executed this suspension to comply with US Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC) obligations after the domains appeared on the
Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Tragically, A/I has announced it
is closing down under this pressure.
Given PIR's explicit commitments to human rights frameworks and due
process, there is a clear opportunity for NCSG to focus on actionable
governance and procedural standards. I agree with the recent suggestions
from Carlos and Farzaneh that our response should not focus solely on this
individual case but should address broader systemic issues and cross-border
effects of national legal measures. Specifically, NCSG can play a key role
by:
1. Requesting full transparency regarding the exact legal obligations,
implementation discretion, and procedural steps taken by PIR and its
registry service providers when executing registry-level suspensions such
as serverHold.
2. Advocating for formal safeguards, including mandatory human rights
impact assessments, operationalised notice requirements, and clear appeal
or review mechanisms before global DNS infrastructure is disrupted.
3. Framing the upcoming policy discussion around how noncommercial
interests and international human rights principles—particularly freedom of
expression and association online—can be systematically protected against
overbroad administrative actions and sanctions regimes.
4. Ensuring internal transparency by circulating any draft statement to
the membership for consideration before it is issued as an official NCSG
position.
I look forward to discussing these aspects and our joint statement during
tomorrow's policy meeting if time permits from my end.
--
Best Regards,
EPK
KENYANITO
Ephraim Percy Kenyanito
LL.M. (International Trade Law), LL.M. (TMT Law), MBA, PMP, MCIArb, CPM-MTI
International Lawyer · Arbitrator · Mediator · Project Management
Professional
International Trade & Commercial Law · Technology · Media ·
Telecommunications · ADR
Publisher, *African TMT Law Roundup* <https://ekenyanito.com/roundups/>
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<https://linkedin.com/in/ekenyanito>
On Tue, 8 Sept 2026 at 13:50, farzaneh badii <
00001deb507b73c5-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu> wrote:
> We have a policy meeting on Wednesday. Tomorrow. we can allocate a chunk
> of time to this topic and how to write a statement. Please join; however,
> if you cannot attend, you can converse here and we will take your comment
> into consideration.
> transparency and access to Internet infrastructure, along with overcoming
> sanctions barriers have been discussed extensively at NCSG and in my
> opinion we can build on our common position. The conversation is not about
> whether to act, but what action to take.
>
> My opinion is that we generally can’t be so reactive and the statement
> should not focus only on the recent case. We should come up with a plan and
> I ask anyone who is bothered by this issue to step up.
>
> In my opinion we can’t stop at transparency and process . They have been
> doing “transparency” reporting. Those reports have to be more detailed.
>
> Sanctions have affected people's access for many years. By now, there is
> abundance of evidence to demonstrate that economic sanctions and counter
> terrorism frameworks have devestating effects on access to the Internet and
> digital services and cannot be proportional and in effect not always
> aligned with the rule of law and human rights principles, and working on
> process in my opinion cannot on its own be sufficient, I think it might get
> us closer to advocating for not using these mechanisms for governing the
> Internet but not sufficient.
>
> I used to advocate for waivers and licenses and carve outs. But these
> things can be just revoked or imposed at the whim of a government ( and I
> am not only talking about the US here). Compliance is hard and we live in a
> world where the companies are so risk-averse that they don't even ask the
> government for clarification. They just block. And these are companies with
> commitments to keep the Internet open and interoperable...
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Farzaneh
>
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2026 at 2:13 PM Carlos Vera <
> 000022318a8e4197-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu> wrote:
> >
> > Dear Nils et all:
> >
> > I believe there is a concrete role for NCSG here beyond debating whether
> PIR should have acted differently.
> >
> > The public record does not yet allow us to clearly establish what PIR
> was legally required to do, what discretion it had, if any, and why
> serverHold was the appropriate response. Before drawing conclusions, these
> facts should be sufficiently documented by the relevant parties.
> >
> > NCSG can help identify the information that is missing, seek
> clarification from the relevant actors within the ICANN ecosystem, and
> determine whether this case reveals a broader transparency or procedural
> gap.
> >
> > More importantly, NCSG could formulate what minimum transparency should
> be expected when national legal measures result in actions affecting
> globally used DNS resources: enough to understand the legal basis, the
> Registry Operator’s role and discretion, the action taken, and the
> available mechanisms for review.
> >
> > That would give us both a sound basis for assessing this case and a
> concrete contribution toward making future cases clearer and more
> accountable.
> >
> > Carlos
> >
> > > El sept 7, 2026, a la(s) 09:20, Niels ten Oever <
> lists at digitaldissidents.org> escribió:
> > >
> > > Dear Carlos,
> > >
> > > In my initial post I did _not_ write that PIR should not comply, but
> rather the problem is that they did not make any statement.
> > >
> > > PIR isn't a generic intermediary with no independent human rights
> posture. It has publicly committed to exactly the kind of assessment you're
> describing as unreasonable to expect. It worked with ARTICLE 19 and the
> Danish Institute for Human Rights on a human rights impact assessment, has
> built commitments to freedom of expression, access to information, and
> access to effective remedy into its policies, and has stood up an appeal
> process for .ORG registrants precisely so takedown decisions aren't simple
> administrative pass-throughs [0]. If that framework means anything, it
> should apply with more force here, not less, given the scale of impact.
> > >
> > > So I don't think this is purely a question of whether the designation
> is justified versus whether PIR complied lawfully. The manner and speed of
> compliance is itself a human rights and due-process question, and one PIR
> has already told the public it takes seriously. I'd like to see it apply
> that framework here rather than treat immediate, full termination as the
> only legally available response.
> > >
> > > If you're interested in the relation between business and human
> rights, you could have a look at the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
> Human Rights [1].
> > >
> > > Best,
> > >
> > > Niels
> > >
> > >
> > > [0]
> https://pir.org/news-insights/assessing-human-rights-impacts-at-public-interest-registry/
> > > [1]
> https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >> On 9/7/26 16:06, Carlos Vera wrote:
> > >> Thank you both for your thoughtful responses. I think we are
> fundamentally concerned about many of the same principles, even if we
> approach them from different perspectives and place different emphasis on
> some of them.
> > >> I agree that human rights remain relevant in counter-terrorism
> measures, and that impacts on legitimate third parties should not be
> ignored. I also agree that government decisions can and should be subject
> to scrutiny and challenge.
> > >> Where I differ is on what follows from those concerns for an
> infrastructure operator such as PIR.
> > >> A designation does not become optional simply because it is
> administrative, contested, or because the underlying evidence has not been
> made fully public. While it remains legally in force, an organization
> subject to that jurisdiction is required to act accordingly. PIR cannot
> reasonably be expected to conduct its own assessment of whether OFAC has
> met the evidentiary burden for the designation and then decide whether to
> comply.
> > >> The impact on journalists, activists or other legitimate users of A/I
> services is a serious concern. But that raises questions about the design
> of sanctions, due process, proportionality, and effective mechanisms for
> review. It does not necessarily mean that PIR should delay or weaken a
> measure it is legally required to implement.
> > >> I therefore see two distinct issues that should not be conflated:
> whether the OFAC designation itself is justified and provides adequate
> safeguards and avenues for challenge; and whether PIR acted lawfully and
> within its obligations in responding to a designation already in force.
> > >> Human rights and the rule of law are not opposing principles. Both
> matter, including when dealing with terrorism.
> > >> Carlos
> > >>> El sept 7, 2026, a la(s) 08:21, Niels ten Oever <
> lists at digitaldissidents.org> escribió:
> > >>>
> > >>> Dear Carlos,
> > >>>
> > >>> Thank you for your response. Let me explain my points:
> > >>>
> > >>> - Not all measures taken by a government are lawful merely because
> they are labelled as such;
> > >>>
> > >>> - No evidence has been provided that Autistici/Inventati is engaging
> in, or supporting, terrorism;
> > >>>
> > >>> - Autistici/Inventati is an association enabling freedom of
> expression, access to information, and other human rights. It isn't just
> "the designated entity" whose operational capabilities we'd be defending
> for their own sake — it's infrastructure (secure email, hosting,
> communication tools) that journalists, activists, and human rights
> defenders have relied on for many years, often with no comparable
> alternative;
> > >>>
> > >>> - Limiting the human rights of a party requires meeting a
> significant burden of proof;
> > >>>
> > >>> - No such proof has been provided.
> > >>>
> > >>> Shutting the service down doesn't only affect A/I as an
> organization; it removes access for the population that actually depends on
> it for freedom of expression, access to information, freedom of
> association, and more.
> > >>>
> > >>> So this isn't a case of shielding an actor from consequences; it's a
> case of the collateral damage falling on exactly the people whose rights
> you agree matter. Furthermore, since A/I is itself an association, its own
> right to freedom of association is at stake here too — not only its role as
> an intermediary for others' rights.
> > >>>
> > >>> Best,
> > >>>
> > >>> Niels
> > >>>
> > >>>> On 9/7/26 14:59, Carlos Vera wrote:
> > >>>> I do not see a human-rights conflict merely because a lawful
> measure is enforced against an entity formally designated under a
> counter-terrorism regime.
> > >>>> Human-rights concerns may arise where innocent third parties are
> affected, and those effects deserve consideration. But that is different
> from suggesting that the designated entity itself should be protected from
> the consequences of the measure, or that lawful enforcement should be
> delayed in order to preserve its operational capabilities
> > >>>> Carlos Vera
> > >>>>> El sept 7, 2026, a la(s) 06:44, Niels ten Oever <00001ded0bc22afd-
> dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu> escribió:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Hi all,
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> It is very sad to share the news that Autistici/Inventati is
> closing down under the pressure:
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> https://keepitfree.ai/announcements/a/i-shuts-down-stay-human/
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> ISOC, PIR and Identity Digital have not made a public statement
> yet about this (as far as I know), but I think that the optics that a
> Public Interest Registry prioritizes legal compliance over human rights is
> quite negative for the latter, and could set bad precedents.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> I hope that everyone here who has influence and inroads with ISOC,
> PIR, and Identity Digital can bring it to their attention. I think it would
> look very good if we as NCSG could do a statement about it.
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Best,
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> Niels
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> On 9/2/26 11:01, Kenechukwu Okekenta wrote:
> > >>>>>> I agree that the ability to seek clarifications on what happened
> and demand for possible review and/or corrections are acceptable
> safeguards, which may not be obtainable in many other jurisdictions.
> > >>>>>> Nonetheless, the issue may also have brought to limelight, the
> possible consequences of having a "blanket online terrorism attribution"
> for every resiliently dissenting voice.
> > >>>>>> I also agree that terrorism is real and should be given the
> attention it needs, but given the currently available details and events we
> have witnessed in recent past, it might be obvious that any legal
> framework, policy or directive that may have motivated this "blanket online
> terrorism attribution", may have been hastily done and didn't consider all
> the possible consequences of such directive.
> > >>>>>> Just as someone hinted, this may have come as a result of looking
> the other way, when sanctions against dissenting online voices targeted
> "our" perceived, "enemy".
> > >>>>>> Therefore, I think it's important that we try not to fall for
> certain decisions out of mere emotions, but rather to pursue rationality,
> regardless of convenience. It would appear that at one point or another, we
> often get measured for, using the same cups we have used for others.
> > >>>>>> In any case, I look forward to a possible clarification, appeal
> and the decisions, that might follow.
> > >>>>>> *Engr. Kenechukwu Okekenta fNSIG*
> > >>>>>> *IT **Project Coordinator, **Support Specialist, **Security
> Analyst,* *CDPO and Educator*
> > >>>>>> *LinkedIn <http://linkedin.com/in/kenechukwu-okekenta>
> > >>>>>> *
> > >>>>>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2026, 07:25 Carlos Vera <000022318a8e4197-dmarc-
> request at listserv.syr.edu <mailto:000022318a8e4197-dmarc-
> request at listserv.syr.edu>> wrote:
> > >>>>>> I wonder whether we should also ask a different question: in
> which
> > >>>>>> other jurisdictions or institutional settings would a
> discussion
> > >>>>>> like this one be possible — and, more importantly, protected?
> > >>>>>> Terrorism is real, and states necessarily have legal
> frameworks to
> > >>>>>> confront it. Those frameworks inevitably create difficult
> tensions
> > >>>>>> when they reach Internet infrastructure: security, due process,
> > >>>>>> proportionality, freedom of expression and continued access
> will not
> > >>>>>> always point in the same direction.
> > >>>>>> Changing jurisdiction does not eliminate those tensions. The
> > >>>>>> relevant comparison should therefore not simply be which
> > >>>>>> jurisdiction exercises less power, but which systems provide
> > >>>>>> meaningful safeguards when that power is exercised:
> transparency,
> > >>>>>> the ability to challenge the legal basis, independent review,
> appeal
> > >>>>>> and the possibility of correcting a decision.
> > >>>>>> The fact that we can openly question what happened to
> autistici.org
> > >>>>>> <http://autistici.org>, examine OFAC’s legal basis and GL36,
> ask PIR
> > >>>>>> to explain the measure, and debate whether serverHold was
> actually
> > >>>>>> required does not establish that the decision was correct. But
> the
> > >>>>>> possibility of having that discussion, and of challenging the
> > >>>>>> decision through institutional and legal mechanisms, is itself
> an
> > >>>>>> important safeguard.
> > >>>>>> I am not sure that the same discussion, with the same
> guarantees,
> > >>>>>> would necessarily be possible in every alternative
> jurisdiction we
> > >>>>>> might consider.
> > >>>>>> So the problem is therefore not jurisdiction alone, but how we
> > >>>>>> preserve effective counter-terrorism measures while ensuring
> that
> > >>>>>> their effects on global Internet infrastructure are legally
> > >>>>>> justified, reviewable and no broader than necessary.
> > >>>>>> Carlos Vera
> > >>>>>>> El sept 1, 2026, a la(s) 21:05, farzaneh badii
> <00001deb507b73c5-
> > >>>>>>> dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu <mailto:
> 00001deb507b73c5-dmarc-
> > >>>>>>> request at listserv.syr.edu>> escribió:
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> This particular problem is primarily not about ICANN
> > >>>>>>> jurisdiction. It has to do with the registry jurisdiction.
> > >>>>>>> Diversifying registries jurisdiction would be a great
> solution.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> But lets say we need to change ICANN jurisdiction. where
> should it
> > >>>>>>> go? The EU? They have a sanction regime that has now started
> > >>>>>>> sanctioning individuals for their speech. They also have an
> anti-
> > >>>>>>> terrorism regime.
> > >>>>>>> Canada has its own sanctions regime. The UK, has one of the
> worst
> > >>>>>>> sanction regimes with terrible terrorism laws that apply
> online
> > >>>>>>> and have led to prosecution and prison. Australia also has a
> > >>>>>>> sanction regime. Should ICANN be an international org?
> > >>>>>>> International orgs also have a sanction regime, for terrorism
> > >>>>>>> specifically.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> When we warned against using terrorism framework to punish
> online
> > >>>>>>> activities and diminish online existence, people didn’t mind
> it
> > >>>>>>> because it was being used against the people they didn’t agree
> > >>>>>>> with. When we said don’t use sanction framework for Internet
> > >>>>>>> infrastructure it’s never proportional, people again didn’t
> mind
> > >>>>>>> it and wanted to use it against the “enemy”.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> Also in jurisdiction work stream 2 we worked hard to at least
> get
> > >>>>>>> some OFAC licenses. Progress is slow but they are required to
> look
> > >>>>>>> into obtaining an ofac license.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> The problem is our legal systems and jurisdictions “globally”
> .
> > >>>>>>> The problem is terrorism framework and sanctions. This is why
> we
> > >>>>>>> should speak up against using these frameworks that threaten
> > >>>>>>> online presence, regardless of who is being deprived of
> access.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> Registries based in the US and other countries have been
> > >>>>>>> confiscating people’s domain names from sanctioned countries
> for
> > >>>>>>> years. Registries in the US say domain name registrant
> should go
> > >>>>>>> and get an ofac license. Everybody passes the ball onto
> somebody
> > >>>>>>> else. There will be a surge of registration at CCTLD level.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> We weren’t successful at encouraging registries to receive
> ofac
> > >>>>>>> licenses or appeal a ruling or discuss with ofac or help the
> > >>>>>>> domain name registrant with restoring access legally. Tech
> > >>>>>>> companies usually don’t do that, except GutHub. But maybe this
> > >>>>>>> will allow for alternative jurisdictions to become popular for
> > >>>>>>> registering domains and maybe we should encourage domain
> > >>>>>>> registration in multiple jurisdictions for resiliency.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> Farzaneh
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2026 at 9:32 PM Michael Karanicolas
> > >>>>>>> <0000235aca298685-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu
> > >>>>>>> <mailto:0000235aca298685-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu>>
> wrote:
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> I don't mean to open up any old wounds from folks who were
> > >>>>>>> involved in
> > >>>>>>> the jurisdiction debates in Workstream 2 (or earlier...),
> but
> > >>>>>>> given
> > >>>>>>> the directions things have been going in the U.S. it's
> honestly
> > >>>>>>> irresponsible that they continue to wield this level of
> > >>>>>>> influence over
> > >>>>>>> the DNS, and that organizations like ICANN and PIR haven't
> > >>>>>>> done more
> > >>>>>>> to hedge against the inevitable abuses that are likely
> coming
> > >>>>>>> down the
> > >>>>>>> pike.
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2026 at 5:11 PM Kathy Kleiman
> > >>>>>>> <00001e85639e37fc-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu
> > >>>>>>> <mailto:00001e85639e37fc-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu>>
> wrote:
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > Hi Niels and All,
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > I checked with PIR and learned the following: This was
> an
> > >>>>>>> instance
> > >>>>>>> > where the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a
> > >>>>>>> financial
> > >>>>>>> > enforcement agency of the US Department of the Treasury
> > >>>>>>> specifically put
> > >>>>>>> > these specific domain names on the “Specially Designated
> > >>>>>>> National” or
> > >>>>>>> > “SDN” list. The action was taken by Identity Digital
> > >>>>>>> (handling Registry
> > >>>>>>> > Service Provider processes), which is legally required
> to
> > >>>>>>> monitor the
> > >>>>>>> > SDN list for domains and if there’s a direct match,
> suspend
> > >>>>>>> the name to
> > >>>>>>> > comply with US OFAC obligations as a service provider.
> As
> > >>>>>>> US-based
> > >>>>>>> > companies, both ID and PIR are bound to follow US law.
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > OFAC maintains an appeals process for someone seeking
> to get
> > >>>>>>> their name
> > >>>>>>> > removed from the list:
> > >>>>>>> >
> https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-
> > >>>>>>>
> list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list
> > >>>>>>> <
> https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-
> > >>>>>>>
> list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list>.
> > >>>>>>> > If the domain names get removed from the SDN list, the
> > >>>>>>> suspensions can
> > >>>>>>> > be lifted.
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > -------------------------
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > Best regards, Kathy
> > >>>>>>> >
> > >>>>>>> > >
> > >>>>>>> > > On 8/28/2026 11:42 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote:
> > >>>>>>> > >> Hi all,
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >> Who is currently our representative on the PIR
> board? It
> > >>>>>>> is quite
> > >>>>>>> > >> unsettling that PIR has taken away the .org
> registration
> > >>>>>>> from an
> > >>>>>>> > >> Italian NGO following Trump government's executive
> order.
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >> https://sabotmedia.noblogs.org/the-server-called-
> > >>>>>>> paranoia-defend-autistici-inventati-before-september-25/
> > >>>>>>> <
> https://sabotmedia.noblogs.org/the-server-called-paranoia-
> > >>>>>>> defend-autistici-inventati-before-september-25/>
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >> Best,
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >> Niels
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > >>
> > >>>>>>> > --
> > >>>>>>> > Kathy Kleiman
> > >>>>>>> > Past President, Domain Name Rights Coalition
> > >>>>>>>
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> --
> > >>>>> Niels ten Oever, PhD
> > >>>>> Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab -
> University of Amsterdam
> > >>>>> Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University
> of Amsterdam
> > >>>>>
> > >>>>> W: https://criticalinfralab.net
> > >>>>> W: https://nielstenoever.net
> > >>>>> PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
> > >>>
> > >>> --
> > >>> Niels ten Oever, PhD
> > >>> Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab - University
> of Amsterdam
> > >>> Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University of
> Amsterdam
> > >>>
> > >>> W: https://criticalinfralab.net
> > >>> W: https://nielstenoever.net
> > >>> PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
> > >>>
> > >
> > > --
> > > Niels ten Oever, PhD
> > > Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab - University
> of Amsterdam
> > > Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University of
> Amsterdam
> > >
> > > W: https://criticalinfralab.net
> > > W: https://nielstenoever.net
> > > PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
> > >
>
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