[Ncsg-discuss] PIR and Autistici/Inventati
Niels ten Oever
00001ded0bc22afd-dmarc-request at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
Mon Sep 7 17:20:42 EEST 2026
Dear Carlos,
In my initial post I did _not_ write that PIR should not comply, but
rather the problem is that they did not make any statement.
PIR isn't a generic intermediary with no independent human rights
posture. It has publicly committed to exactly the kind of assessment
you're describing as unreasonable to expect. It worked with ARTICLE 19
and the Danish Institute for Human Rights on a human rights impact
assessment, has built commitments to freedom of expression, access to
information, and access to effective remedy into its policies, and has
stood up an appeal process for .ORG registrants precisely so takedown
decisions aren't simple administrative pass-throughs [0]. If that
framework means anything, it should apply with more force here, not
less, given the scale of impact.
So I don't think this is purely a question of whether the designation is
justified versus whether PIR complied lawfully. The manner and speed of
compliance is itself a human rights and due-process question, and one
PIR has already told the public it takes seriously. I'd like to see it
apply that framework here rather than treat immediate, full termination
as the only legally available response.
If you're interested in the relation between business and human rights,
you could have a look at the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights [1].
Best,
Niels
[0]
https://pir.org/news-insights/assessing-human-rights-impacts-at-public-interest-registry/
[1]
https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf
On 9/7/26 16:06, Carlos Vera wrote:
> Thank you both for your thoughtful responses. I think we are fundamentally concerned about many of the same principles, even if we approach them from different perspectives and place different emphasis on some of them.
>
> I agree that human rights remain relevant in counter-terrorism measures, and that impacts on legitimate third parties should not be ignored. I also agree that government decisions can and should be subject to scrutiny and challenge.
>
> Where I differ is on what follows from those concerns for an infrastructure operator such as PIR.
>
> A designation does not become optional simply because it is administrative, contested, or because the underlying evidence has not been made fully public. While it remains legally in force, an organization subject to that jurisdiction is required to act accordingly. PIR cannot reasonably be expected to conduct its own assessment of whether OFAC has met the evidentiary burden for the designation and then decide whether to comply.
>
> The impact on journalists, activists or other legitimate users of A/I services is a serious concern. But that raises questions about the design of sanctions, due process, proportionality, and effective mechanisms for review. It does not necessarily mean that PIR should delay or weaken a measure it is legally required to implement.
>
> I therefore see two distinct issues that should not be conflated: whether the OFAC designation itself is justified and provides adequate safeguards and avenues for challenge; and whether PIR acted lawfully and within its obligations in responding to a designation already in force.
>
> Human rights and the rule of law are not opposing principles. Both matter, including when dealing with terrorism.
>
> Carlos
>
>> El sept 7, 2026, a la(s) 08:21, Niels ten Oever <lists at digitaldissidents.org> escribió:
>>
>> Dear Carlos,
>>
>> Thank you for your response. Let me explain my points:
>>
>> - Not all measures taken by a government are lawful merely because they are labelled as such;
>>
>> - No evidence has been provided that Autistici/Inventati is engaging in, or supporting, terrorism;
>>
>> - Autistici/Inventati is an association enabling freedom of expression, access to information, and other human rights. It isn't just "the designated entity" whose operational capabilities we'd be defending for their own sake — it's infrastructure (secure email, hosting, communication tools) that journalists, activists, and human rights defenders have relied on for many years, often with no comparable alternative;
>>
>> - Limiting the human rights of a party requires meeting a significant burden of proof;
>>
>> - No such proof has been provided.
>>
>> Shutting the service down doesn't only affect A/I as an organization; it removes access for the population that actually depends on it for freedom of expression, access to information, freedom of association, and more.
>>
>> So this isn't a case of shielding an actor from consequences; it's a case of the collateral damage falling on exactly the people whose rights you agree matter. Furthermore, since A/I is itself an association, its own right to freedom of association is at stake here too — not only its role as an intermediary for others' rights.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Niels
>>
>>> On 9/7/26 14:59, Carlos Vera wrote:
>>> I do not see a human-rights conflict merely because a lawful measure is enforced against an entity formally designated under a counter-terrorism regime.
>>> Human-rights concerns may arise where innocent third parties are affected, and those effects deserve consideration. But that is different from suggesting that the designated entity itself should be protected from the consequences of the measure, or that lawful enforcement should be delayed in order to preserve its operational capabilities
>>> Carlos Vera
>>>> El sept 7, 2026, a la(s) 06:44, Niels ten Oever <00001ded0bc22afd- dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu> escribió:
>>>>
>>>> Hi all,
>>>>
>>>> It is very sad to share the news that Autistici/Inventati is closing down under the pressure:
>>>>
>>>> https://keepitfree.ai/announcements/a/i-shuts-down-stay-human/
>>>>
>>>> ISOC, PIR and Identity Digital have not made a public statement yet about this (as far as I know), but I think that the optics that a Public Interest Registry prioritizes legal compliance over human rights is quite negative for the latter, and could set bad precedents.
>>>>
>>>> I hope that everyone here who has influence and inroads with ISOC, PIR, and Identity Digital can bring it to their attention. I think it would look very good if we as NCSG could do a statement about it.
>>>>
>>>> Best,
>>>>
>>>> Niels
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 9/2/26 11:01, Kenechukwu Okekenta wrote:
>>>>> I agree that the ability to seek clarifications on what happened and demand for possible review and/or corrections are acceptable safeguards, which may not be obtainable in many other jurisdictions.
>>>>> Nonetheless, the issue may also have brought to limelight, the possible consequences of having a "blanket online terrorism attribution" for every resiliently dissenting voice.
>>>>> I also agree that terrorism is real and should be given the attention it needs, but given the currently available details and events we have witnessed in recent past, it might be obvious that any legal framework, policy or directive that may have motivated this "blanket online terrorism attribution", may have been hastily done and didn't consider all the possible consequences of such directive.
>>>>> Just as someone hinted, this may have come as a result of looking the other way, when sanctions against dissenting online voices targeted "our" perceived, "enemy".
>>>>> Therefore, I think it's important that we try not to fall for certain decisions out of mere emotions, but rather to pursue rationality, regardless of convenience. It would appear that at one point or another, we often get measured for, using the same cups we have used for others.
>>>>> In any case, I look forward to a possible clarification, appeal and the decisions, that might follow.
>>>>> *Engr. Kenechukwu Okekenta fNSIG*
>>>>> *IT **Project Coordinator, **Support Specialist, **Security Analyst,* *CDPO and Educator*
>>>>> *LinkedIn <http://linkedin.com/in/kenechukwu-okekenta>
>>>>> *
>>>>> On Wed, Sep 2, 2026, 07:25 Carlos Vera <000022318a8e4197-dmarc- request at listserv.syr.edu <mailto:000022318a8e4197-dmarc- request at listserv.syr.edu>> wrote:
>>>>> I wonder whether we should also ask a different question: in which
>>>>> other jurisdictions or institutional settings would a discussion
>>>>> like this one be possible — and, more importantly, protected?
>>>>> Terrorism is real, and states necessarily have legal frameworks to
>>>>> confront it. Those frameworks inevitably create difficult tensions
>>>>> when they reach Internet infrastructure: security, due process,
>>>>> proportionality, freedom of expression and continued access will not
>>>>> always point in the same direction.
>>>>> Changing jurisdiction does not eliminate those tensions. The
>>>>> relevant comparison should therefore not simply be which
>>>>> jurisdiction exercises less power, but which systems provide
>>>>> meaningful safeguards when that power is exercised: transparency,
>>>>> the ability to challenge the legal basis, independent review, appeal
>>>>> and the possibility of correcting a decision.
>>>>> The fact that we can openly question what happened to autistici.org
>>>>> <http://autistici.org>, examine OFAC’s legal basis and GL36, ask PIR
>>>>> to explain the measure, and debate whether serverHold was actually
>>>>> required does not establish that the decision was correct. But the
>>>>> possibility of having that discussion, and of challenging the
>>>>> decision through institutional and legal mechanisms, is itself an
>>>>> important safeguard.
>>>>> I am not sure that the same discussion, with the same guarantees,
>>>>> would necessarily be possible in every alternative jurisdiction we
>>>>> might consider.
>>>>> So the problem is therefore not jurisdiction alone, but how we
>>>>> preserve effective counter-terrorism measures while ensuring that
>>>>> their effects on global Internet infrastructure are legally
>>>>> justified, reviewable and no broader than necessary.
>>>>> Carlos Vera
>>>>>> El sept 1, 2026, a la(s) 21:05, farzaneh badii <00001deb507b73c5-
>>>>>> dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu <mailto:00001deb507b73c5-dmarc-
>>>>>> request at listserv.syr.edu>> escribió:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This particular problem is primarily not about ICANN
>>>>>> jurisdiction. It has to do with the registry jurisdiction.
>>>>>> Diversifying registries jurisdiction would be a great solution.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But lets say we need to change ICANN jurisdiction. where should it
>>>>>> go? The EU? They have a sanction regime that has now started
>>>>>> sanctioning individuals for their speech. They also have an anti-
>>>>>> terrorism regime.
>>>>>> Canada has its own sanctions regime. The UK, has one of the worst
>>>>>> sanction regimes with terrible terrorism laws that apply online
>>>>>> and have led to prosecution and prison. Australia also has a
>>>>>> sanction regime. Should ICANN be an international org?
>>>>>> International orgs also have a sanction regime, for terrorism
>>>>>> specifically.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we warned against using terrorism framework to punish online
>>>>>> activities and diminish online existence, people didn’t mind it
>>>>>> because it was being used against the people they didn’t agree
>>>>>> with. When we said don’t use sanction framework for Internet
>>>>>> infrastructure it’s never proportional, people again didn’t mind
>>>>>> it and wanted to use it against the “enemy”.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Also in jurisdiction work stream 2 we worked hard to at least get
>>>>>> some OFAC licenses. Progress is slow but they are required to look
>>>>>> into obtaining an ofac license.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The problem is our legal systems and jurisdictions “globally” .
>>>>>> The problem is terrorism framework and sanctions. This is why we
>>>>>> should speak up against using these frameworks that threaten
>>>>>> online presence, regardless of who is being deprived of access.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Registries based in the US and other countries have been
>>>>>> confiscating people’s domain names from sanctioned countries for
>>>>>> years. Registries in the US say domain name registrant should go
>>>>>> and get an ofac license. Everybody passes the ball onto somebody
>>>>>> else. There will be a surge of registration at CCTLD level.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We weren’t successful at encouraging registries to receive ofac
>>>>>> licenses or appeal a ruling or discuss with ofac or help the
>>>>>> domain name registrant with restoring access legally. Tech
>>>>>> companies usually don’t do that, except GutHub. But maybe this
>>>>>> will allow for alternative jurisdictions to become popular for
>>>>>> registering domains and maybe we should encourage domain
>>>>>> registration in multiple jurisdictions for resiliency.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Farzaneh
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2026 at 9:32 PM Michael Karanicolas
>>>>>> <0000235aca298685-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu
>>>>>> <mailto:0000235aca298685-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't mean to open up any old wounds from folks who were
>>>>>> involved in
>>>>>> the jurisdiction debates in Workstream 2 (or earlier...), but
>>>>>> given
>>>>>> the directions things have been going in the U.S. it's honestly
>>>>>> irresponsible that they continue to wield this level of
>>>>>> influence over
>>>>>> the DNS, and that organizations like ICANN and PIR haven't
>>>>>> done more
>>>>>> to hedge against the inevitable abuses that are likely coming
>>>>>> down the
>>>>>> pike.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Sep 1, 2026 at 5:11 PM Kathy Kleiman
>>>>>> <00001e85639e37fc-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu
>>>>>> <mailto:00001e85639e37fc-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu>> wrote:
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Hi Niels and All,
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > I checked with PIR and learned the following: This was an
>>>>>> instance
>>>>>> > where the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a
>>>>>> financial
>>>>>> > enforcement agency of the US Department of the Treasury
>>>>>> specifically put
>>>>>> > these specific domain names on the “Specially Designated
>>>>>> National” or
>>>>>> > “SDN” list. The action was taken by Identity Digital
>>>>>> (handling Registry
>>>>>> > Service Provider processes), which is legally required to
>>>>>> monitor the
>>>>>> > SDN list for domains and if there’s a direct match, suspend
>>>>>> the name to
>>>>>> > comply with US OFAC obligations as a service provider. As
>>>>>> US-based
>>>>>> > companies, both ID and PIR are bound to follow US law.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > OFAC maintains an appeals process for someone seeking to get
>>>>>> their name
>>>>>> > removed from the list:
>>>>>> > https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-
>>>>>> list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list
>>>>>> <https://ofac.treasury.gov/specially-designated-nationals-
>>>>>> list-sdn-list/filing-a-petition-for-removal-from-an-ofac-list>.
>>>>>> > If the domain names get removed from the SDN list, the
>>>>>> suspensions can
>>>>>> > be lifted.
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > -------------------------
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > Best regards, Kathy
>>>>>> >
>>>>>> > >
>>>>>> > > On 8/28/2026 11:42 AM, Niels ten Oever wrote:
>>>>>> > >> Hi all,
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >> Who is currently our representative on the PIR board? It
>>>>>> is quite
>>>>>> > >> unsettling that PIR has taken away the .org registration
>>>>>> from an
>>>>>> > >> Italian NGO following Trump government's executive order.
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >> https://sabotmedia.noblogs.org/the-server-called-
>>>>>> paranoia-defend-autistici-inventati-before-september-25/
>>>>>> <https://sabotmedia.noblogs.org/the-server-called-paranoia-
>>>>>> defend-autistici-inventati-before-september-25/>
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >> Best,
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >> Niels
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > >>
>>>>>> > --
>>>>>> > Kathy Kleiman
>>>>>> > Past President, Domain Name Rights Coalition
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> --
>>>> Niels ten Oever, PhD
>>>> Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab - University of Amsterdam
>>>> Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University of Amsterdam
>>>>
>>>> W: https://criticalinfralab.net
>>>> W: https://nielstenoever.net
>>>> PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
>>
>> --
>> Niels ten Oever, PhD
>> Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab - University of Amsterdam
>> Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University of Amsterdam
>>
>> W: https://criticalinfralab.net
>> W: https://nielstenoever.net
>> PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
>>
--
Niels ten Oever, PhD
Co-Principal Investigator - critical infrastructure lab - University of
Amsterdam
Assistant Professor - Department of European Studies - University of
Amsterdam
W: https://criticalinfralab.net
W: https://nielstenoever.net
PGP: 4254 ECD5 D4CF F6AF 8B91 0D9F EFAD 2E49 CC90 C10C
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