[Ncsg-discuss] Important Law Enforcement Agencies, Authentication, Accountability and Safeguards

[gopal]

Thank you Farzaneh.

How does this take into account GDPR Right to Erasure / to be Forgotten" @ https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten/#:~:text=In%20Article%2017%2C%20the%20GDPR,that%20individual%20withdraws%20their%20consent.

Gopal T V
0 9840121302
https://vidwan.inflibnet.ac.in/profile/57545
https://www.facebook.com/gopal.tadepalli
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Dr. T V Gopal
Retired Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering &
Retired Director, Centre for Applied Research in Indic Technologies [CARIT]
College of Engineering, Guindy Campus
Anna University
Chennai - 600 025, INDIA
Ph : (Off) 22351723 Extn. 3340
       (Res) 24454753
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________________________________
From: NCSG-Discuss <NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU> on behalf of farzaneh badii <farzaneh.badii at GMAIL.COM>
Sent: 23 November 2025 22:33
To: NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU <NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU>
Subject: Important Law Enforcement Agencies, Authentication, Accountability and Safeguards


Dear all,

I want to provide an update on where things currently stand regarding law-enforcement (LEA) authentication, the work of the practitioner group, and the implications of the ICANN Board’s October 2025 resolution.

Given recent developments, I believe NCSG should consider a coordinated response. Several months ago, when PSWG (public Safety Working Group) Gabriel briefed us on their intention to work with ICANN Org to validate LEA domain names, NCSG agreed that LEA could submit domain names of Law Enforcement Agencies to the RDRS, but only if specific safeguards and conditions were met.

We conveyed these conditions clearly at the time, yet we have not received any indication that these concerns are being incorporated into PSWG's planning. To remind everyone of what NCSG agreed to:1)  a verified LEA domain can serve only as a supplementary signal and not as a standalone authentication mechanism. 2) Disclosure decisions must still be grounded in rights-balancing, necessity, and a clear legal basis. 3) We stressed that domain validation does not prove identity; spoofing remains a serious risk, and both registrars and ICANN must be equipped to handle that. 4) We also emphasized that any “verified LEA domain list” must include renewal, periodic review, and removal processes to prevent stale or misused entries—especially for agencies that operate multiple domains. In addition, we were explicit that domain-based checks can only be a temporary measure while a more robust, accountable authentication system is being developed. 5) We recommended a six-month review period to evaluate registrar confidence, safeguard effectiveness, and progress toward a long-term solution.

Importantly, we made clear that any authentication mechanism must incorporate safeguards, transparency, oversight, and avenues for redress for registrants whose data may be accessed.

The Board’s October 2025 resolution intersects<https://www.icann.org/en/board-activities-and-meetings/materials/approved-resolutions-regular-meeting-of-the-icann-board-30-10-2025-en> with this work by encouraging expanded LEA authentication efforts and urging alignment of SSAD-related policies with disclosure mechanisms. However, the Board’s rationale focuses almost exclusively on RDRS continuity, registrar/requestor satisfaction, voluntary participation, and ICANN’s operational resources. What is missing is any acknowledgment of the safeguards, accountability requirements, or user-impact considerations that NCSG has raised repeatedly in meetings, letters, and contributions to the RDRS Standing Committee report. Registrants and end users—who are directly affected—are absent from the Board’s “community impact” framing.

Given this gap between what NCSG has consistently recommended and what the Board has recognized, I suggest that NCSG take two steps.

First, send a short letter to the ICANN Board reaffirming that we support LEA authentication only if safeguards, transparency, oversight, and renewal mechanisms are integral to the system, and noting that the resolution omits the impact on registrants and end users.

Second, develop a concise Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) of the Board resolution and the related RDRS/SSAD work, mapping risks to privacy, due process, non-discrimination, and access to remedy, particularly around cross-border LEA requests.

I can prepare a first draft of the Board letter and a short HRIA scoping note for review.

Best regards,


Farzaneh
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