[Ncsg-discuss] Important Law Enforcement Agencies, Authentication, Accountability and Safeguards

farzaneh badii farzaneh.badii at GMAIL.COM
Mon Nov 24 03:03:40 EET 2025


Hi all,

I have drafted the letter about the Board resolution:
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1oHj3zPZtjNQrgEWJsx70F4e2K6kskYNaUbmmclzhnuM/edit?usp=sharing

Please comment.





Farzaneh


On Sun, Nov 23, 2025 at 12:03 PM farzaneh badii <farzaneh.badii at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> I want to provide an update on where things currently stand regarding
> law-enforcement (LEA) authentication, the work of the practitioner group,
> and the implications of the ICANN Board’s October 2025 resolution.
>
> Given recent developments, I believe NCSG should consider a coordinated
> response. Several months ago, when PSWG (public Safety Working Group) Gabriel
> briefed us on their intention to work with ICANN Org to validate LEA domain
> names, NCSG agreed that LEA could submit domain names of Law Enforcement
> Agencies to the RDRS, but only if specific safeguards and conditions were
> met.
>
> We conveyed these conditions clearly at the time, yet we have not received
> any indication that these concerns are being incorporated into PSWG's
> planning. To remind everyone of what NCSG agreed to:1)  a verified LEA
> domain can serve only as a supplementary signal and not as a standalone
> authentication mechanism. 2) Disclosure decisions must still be grounded
> in rights-balancing, necessity, and a clear legal basis. 3) We stressed
> that domain validation does not prove identity; spoofing remains a serious
> risk, and both registrars and ICANN must be equipped to handle that. 4) We
> also emphasized that any “verified LEA domain list” must include renewal,
> periodic review, and removal processes to prevent stale or misused
> entries—especially for agencies that operate multiple domains. In addition,
> we were explicit that domain-based checks can only be a temporary measure
> while a more robust, accountable authentication system is being developed.
> 5) We recommended a six-month review period to evaluate registrar
> confidence, safeguard effectiveness, and progress toward a long-term
> solution.
>
> Importantly, we made clear that any authentication mechanism must
> incorporate safeguards, transparency, oversight, and avenues for redress
> for registrants whose data may be accessed.
>
> The Board’s October 2025 resolution intersects
> <https://www.icann.org/en/board-activities-and-meetings/materials/approved-resolutions-regular-meeting-of-the-icann-board-30-10-2025-en>
> with this work by encouraging expanded LEA authentication efforts and
> urging alignment of SSAD-related policies with disclosure mechanisms.
> However, the Board’s rationale focuses almost exclusively on RDRS
> continuity, registrar/requestor satisfaction, voluntary participation, and
> ICANN’s operational resources. What is missing is any acknowledgment of the
> safeguards, accountability requirements, or user-impact considerations that
> NCSG has raised repeatedly in meetings, letters, and contributions to the
> RDRS Standing Committee report. Registrants and end users—who are directly
> affected—are absent from the Board’s “community impact” framing.
>
> Given this gap between what NCSG has consistently recommended and what the
> Board has recognized, I suggest that NCSG take two steps.
>
> First, send a short letter to the ICANN Board reaffirming that we support
> LEA authentication only if safeguards, transparency, oversight, and renewal
> mechanisms are integral to the system, and noting that the resolution omits
> the impact on registrants and end users.
>
> Second, develop a concise Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) of the
> Board resolution and the related RDRS/SSAD work, mapping risks to privacy,
> due process, non-discrimination, and access to remedy, particularly around
> cross-border LEA requests.
>
> I can prepare a first draft of the Board letter and a short HRIA scoping
> note for review.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Farzaneh
>
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