[Important/Question and note] Note on Accreditation and Requestor Validation in the Registration Data Request Service (RDRS)

[farzaneh badii]

As you know I am your rep on RDRS SC, which is the triage system for
sending the disclosure of domain name registrants data to the registrar.
It's a pilot project.

We are providing our report and based on the result of the experiment we
are providing the recommendations for consideration of SSAD(the disclosure
policy that was adopted in the past).

For NCSG a few things matter: privacy of the domain name registrants,
accountability and transparency of the system, the requesters and the
registrars.

One of the issues that we are discussing is accreditation of non LEAs. See
the brief below, and my question is: what should we decide? Should we
insist on full accreditation of non LEAs or should we settle on having some
lightweight authentication and ask ICANN and registrars to report on the
requests. I lay out the pros and cons of the approaches below.

*Background:*
As part of the ongoing evaluation of the Registration Data Request Service
(RDRS), several concerns have emerged regarding requestor validation and
accreditation, particularly in relation to non-law enforcement third
parties.

*EPDP Phase 2 Context:*
The EPDP Phase 2 Final Report recommended the creation or designation
of an *Accreditation
Authority* as a critical component of any long-term solution for lawful
disclosure of domain registration data. This recommendation has significant
implications for the  disclosure system

*Some observations*

*Why LEA authentication is needed:*

   1.

   *Misclassification of Requests:*
   RDRS experience indicates that a number of data disclosure requests were
   improperly categorized as originating from law enforcement authorities,
   raising concerns about the accuracy and integrity of requestor
   self-identification.
   2.

   *Lack of Requestor Validation:*
   The absence of an accreditation or identity validation mechanism may
   have contributed to delayed responses from registrars, who are unable to
   confidently assess the requestor’s legal standing and purpose.
   3.

   *Authentication vs. Disclosure Balancing:*
   Note that authentication is not inherently difficult. The core challenge
   lies in balancing a validated requestor’s documented purpose against the
   registrant’s right to privacy, particularly in borderline or ambiguous
   cases.

*Non LEAs*


   1.

   *Risk of Abuse by Authenticated Non-LEAs:*
   We have concerns about the *potential for misuse of access* by
   authenticated third-party requestors, especially those operating in
   jurisdictions with weak human rights protections. Authentication alone does
   not safeguard against disproportionate or abusive requests.

*Recommendations for Follow-up System Design:*

   -

   *Initial Focus on Law Enforcement :*
   I think we should generally agree that future iterations or alternatives
   to RDRS should prioritize *authentication of law enforcement requestors*
   as a first step, both to build trust and to test implementation.
   -

   *Need for Further Policy **refinement: *Discuss how to refine
   accreditation for third party non LEAs so that we bring transparency and
   accountability but also not be entangled in a "trusted flagger" system
   where accreditation could lead to positive answers from the registrars
   without any balance of fundamental rights and disclosure.

Farzaneh
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.ncsg.is/pipermail/ncsg-discuss/attachments/20250524/90969c1c/attachment.htm>