law enforcement authentication and RDRS

[farzaneh badii]

Hi

Thanks all

I sent this to the SC:

Thank you for raising the proposal regarding the submission of verified law
enforcement domain names to ICANN for potential integration into the
Registration Data Request System (RDRS). I’ve shared this with the NCSG and
there is general support for the idea as a *supplementary data point* to
help improve the credibility of law enforcement requests.

Here is a summary of the key feedback and considerations:

   1.

   *Supplementary Signal Only*
   There is consensus that verified law enforcement domains can be a useful
   *additional* signal but should not be treated as a definitive
   authentication mechanism. Disclosure decisions must continue to rely on
   rights-balancing considerations.
   2.

   *Spoofing Awareness*
   The group noted the ease with which email addresses can be spoofed and
   emphasized the need to ensure ICANN and registrars understand this risk.
   Domain verification alone is not sufficient to establish authenticity.
   3.

   *Renewal and Maintenance*
   Any verified domain list should include a mechanism for *periodic review
   and renewal* to avoid stale or misused entries—especially where multiple
   domains may exist within the same agency or department.
   4.

   *Toward a More Robust Solution*
   While the domain-based check may be a useful *palliative*, it should be
   clearly framed as a *temporary* measure while a more robust
   authentication method is developed.
   5.

   *Review Timeline and Evaluation*
   As a next step, the group recommends setting a *review period of six
   months* to evaluate progress toward a longer-term solution. This review
   could also look at how registrars are engaging with the verified domain
   signal—not necessarily by measuring an increase in granted requests, but
   rather by assessing *registrar confidence and acceptance* of this signal
   in their decision-making process.

Overall, we welcome continued exploration of this approach, provided it is
implemented with *clear accountability safeguards*, transparent review
cycles, and an understanding that it is not a final solution.


Farzaneh


On Fri, May 2, 2025 at 11:39 AM Glenn Ricart <
00001c88309eff14-dmarc-request at listserv.syr.edu> wrote:

> I want to emphasize
> Pedro de Perdigão Lana's point about periodic revalidationand Yao Amevi
> A. Sossou's point about it being only one of several validation factors.
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 1, 2025 at 8:40 PM Enrique Chaparro <echaparro at vialibre.org.ar>
> wrote:
>
>> it sounds stronger and more reasonable that LEAs generate a
>> public/private key pair to authenticate themselves. the digest of the
>> public key should be verified through a different channel — somewhat
>> clumsy, perhaps, but it needs to be done only once during the key pair
>> validity period.
>>
>> regards,
>>
>> Tx.
>>
>> Freiheit ist immer Freiheit des Andersdenkenden.
>> -- Rosa Luxemburg
>>
>
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