ICANN Remit: Security & Stability of the DNS System

Thu Jan 24 03:26:44 EET 2019

No, ICANN will not be as a controller for a registrar operates or mandates, ICANN will give only recommendation for them.

From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU] On Behalf Of James Gannon
Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2019 12:19 PM
To: NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU
Subject: Re: ICANN Remit: Security & Stability of the DNS System

I think that if ICANN tried to define how a registarar operates or mandates 2FA for their clients we would see quite quickly that that is very much outside of the bylaws interpretation in my opinion =) 

Not saying its not important, just out of scope for ICANN.

On 24 Jan 2019, at 09:16, David Cake <dave at davecake.net <mailto:dave at davecake.net> > wrote:

Registrar procedures are kind of within ICANN scope, or at least on the edges of it - but certainly procedures of groups that are definitely outside ICANNs remit have definitely been considered as part of ICANN policy processes. That is, ICANN may not in any way control processes like CAs, but it can (and does) consider the needs of such providers when looking at policy issues like RDS.  

David

On 24 Jan 2019, at 4:03 pm, James Gannon <james at CYBERINVASION.NET <mailto:james at CYBERINVASION.NET> > wrote:

DNS below the root is out of scope for ICANN so I don’t agree that that is even a possibility.

On 24 Jan 2019, at 08:59, Vladimer Svanadze <00000585df4969dc-dmarc-request at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU <mailto:00000585df4969dc-dmarc-request at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU> > wrote:

Hello,

Thank you, Sam, for your email, and information provided us.

I agree with David in sort of around the edges of ICANNs remit, but security of DNS is a very important process, and also it is a main target for criminals in the near future. This problem is not only National level, it is a globally problem, and challenge for all DNS Community.

It is not a problem only for the US, it is problem for every infrastructure. I think that will be very important for a stability and security of infrastructure of all countries, if registrar use more technical tools with Unified International Standards of protection, and include secure authentication, multi-factor authentication, as David say. 

Also I would like to add that will be good if around of ICANN will be a discussion about Security and Stability of DNS, and ICANN will develop policy/strategy with recommendation for DNS SSR, as a National, also as a Global level.

And once again I absolutely agree with David in issues of DNS SSR can be tackled solely at the ICANN level.

Lado

From: NCSG-Discuss [mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU] On Behalf Of David Cake
Sent: Wednesday, January 23, 2019 10:47 AM
To: NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU <mailto:NCSG-DISCUSS at LISTSERV.SYR.EDU> 
Subject: Re: ICANN Remit: Security & Stability of the DNS System

Thanks for brining this up, Sam. Some of this is sort of around the edges of ICANNs remit, but I think very useful for the DNS community to discuss. 

These are issues for US infrastructure of  course, but the same attacks, and the same mitigations, apply to all DNS use. It is important for all registrar services to include secure authentication, multi-factor authentication, etc. And supporting Certificate Transparency is definitely outside ICANNs direct remit, but a very interesting topic for discussion. 

A valuable reminder that DNS security is a real, and complex, issue even if many aspects of it are at the edges of ICANNs mission, and not all DNS SSR issues can be tackled solely at the ICANN level. 

David

On 23 Jan 2019, at 9:44 am, Sam Lanfranco < <mailto:lanfran at YORKU.CA> lanfran at YORKU.CA> wrote:

Excuse me if this is too far off base. It does serve as a quick primer on the kinds of threats that the DNS system is up against on a daily basis. 

As we work within the ICANN remit it might be useful to on occasion look out there at the ongoing daily threats to the security and stability of the DNS system. We are keenly aware of when various actors "turn off" the Internet but most of us are less aware of the other forms of attack on DNS security and stability. Here is a link to, and a few words from, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on recent attacks on the DNS system. 

 <https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/> https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/

This page contains a web-friendly version of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s  <https://cyber.dhs.gov/assets/report/ed-19-01.pdf> Emergency Directive 19-01, “Mitigate DNS Infrastructure Tampering”.

Excerpts:  <https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/current-activity/2019/01/22/CISA-Emergency-Directive-DNS-Infrastructure-Tampering> CISA Emergency Directive on DNS Infrastructure Tampering

01/22/2019 06:48 PM EST

Original release date: January 22, 2019

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued an emergency directive to address ongoing incidents associated with global Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure tampering. CISA is aware of multiple executive branch agency domains that were impacted by the tampering campaign and has notified the agencies that maintain them. The directive requires Federal agencies to take specific steps and comply with reporting procedures to mitigate risks from undiscovered tampering, prevent illegitimate DNS activity, and detect unauthorized certificates.

Federal agencies should review  <https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/> Emergency Directive 19-01 for required actions and reporting procedures. 

Background

In coordination with government and industry partners, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is tracking a series of incidents <https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/#fn:1> 1 involving Domain Name System (DNS) infrastructure tampering. CISA is aware of multiple executive branch agency domains that were impacted by the tampering campaign and has notified the agencies that maintain them.

Using the following techniques, attackers have redirected and intercepted web and mail traffic, and could do so for other networked services.

1.	The attacker begins by compromising user credentials, or obtaining them through alternate means, of an account that can make changes to DNS records.
2.	Next, the attacker alters DNS records, like Address (A), Mail Exchanger (MX), or Name Server (NS) records, replacing the legitimate address of a service with an address the attacker controls. This enables them to direct user traffic to their own infrastructure for manipulation or inspection before passing it on to the legitimate service, should they choose. This creates a risk that persists beyond the period of traffic redirection.
3.	Because the attacker can set DNS record values, they can also obtain valid encryption certificates for an organization’s domain names. This allows the redirected traffic to be decrypted, exposing any user-submitted data. Since the certificate is valid for the domain, end users receive no error warnings.

To address the significant and imminent risks to agency information and information systems presented by this activity, this emergency directive requires the following near-term actions to mitigate risks from undiscovered tampering, enable agencies to prevent illegitimate DNS activity for their domains, and detect unauthorized certificates.  

See:  <https://cyber.dhs.gov/ed/19-01/> Emergency Directive 19-01

Posted by: Sam L. NPOC

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