Ominous update on the IANA transition

[Stephanie Perrin]

I agree too.  For an organization the size of ICANN, one ombudsman to 
cover a number of accountabilities should suffice.  On the other hand, I 
do agree that ICANN needs an international appeal mechanism for its 
decisions (ie a Court or Tribunal), I don't think that the Board should 
be the only appeal mechanism, but that is another matter entirely.
Stephanie Perrin

On 2015-05-05 10:55, Seun Ojedeji wrote:
>
> I tend to agree with Sam on this one, especially the pondering 
> questions raised in relation to international oversight.
>
> Cheers!
> sent from Google nexus 4
> kindly excuse brevity and typos.
>
> On 5 May 2015 17:15, "Sam Lanfranco" <lanfran at yorku.ca 
> <mailto:lanfran at yorku.ca>> wrote:
>
>     Carlos,
>
>     Thanks for your comment and flagging the issues of an outside
>     international oversight body, the  ombudsmans (ombudspersons?)
>     office, and the possibility of another office within ICANN to
>     address “these strategic challenges”. Here are some quick comments
>     from the small to the big in terms of challenges here.
>
>     In terms of the choice between the ombudsman and some other new
>     ICANN office, my personal view is to prefer the ombudsman, and not
>     just because it would be less expensive in a time of serious ICANN
>     budget constraints (another challenge). I find it hard to envision
>     a new ICANN office dealing with DNS strategic challenges where
>     that office would not become a lightening rod for a wide variety
>     of external forces interested in issues that would amount to
>     pressure for ICANN scope creep. As well, administrative theory and
>     evidence suggests that a new office, in and of itself, would risk
>     scope creep within its own work agenda, to bolster its existence,
>     especially in times of constrained budgets.
>
>     As for an international (outside) oversight body, for me the core
>     issues are: (a) what principles are to be upheld; (b) keeping
>     clear what should be inside the ICANN DNS system remit; and (c)
>     what within the DNS system should be addressed elsewhere. The
>     primary role of an oversight body is to hold an entity accountable
>     to its remit. How does that get defined in a way that an oversight
>     body: (i) doesn’t foster scope creep by asking ICANN to be
>     accountable for the wrong things, and (ii) helps re-direct DNS
>     concerns (especially content and intellectual property issues) to
>     other appropriate venues?
>
>     Sam L.
>     /
>     On 05/05/2015 11:35 AM, Carlos A. Afonso wrote:
>     /
>>     /Dear Sam,
>>
>>     Powerful message indeed. ICANN needs an outside international oversight
>>     body which would, among other tasks, decidedly help in tackling these
>>     strategic challenges.
>>
>>     But we (NCSG?) seem to agree on this oversight being reduced to an
>>     office within ICANN. What would be the real difference between this
>>     office and the ombudsman? My answer: the ombudsman is much cheaper.
>>
>>     fraternal regards
>>
>>     --c.a./
>

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