



NCSG BRIEFING

GNSO Council Meeting

Thursday, 09 July 2026 · 13:00 UTC

DNS Abuse Mitigation (PDP1 & PDP2) · Authentication for LEA Requests · ICANN86 Recap · Prioritization Pilot


Prepared for NCSG members to support preparation ahead of the Council meeting.

What, When, and Why It Matters to NCSG



When

- Thursday, 09 July 2026
- 13:00 UTC / 09:00 Washington / 14:00 London
- Remote participation via Zoom (link on wiki agenda page)



Agenda Shape

- 7 items, ~100 minutes total
- No motions/votes — all discussion items
- Two DNS Abuse PDP updates dominate the agenda



NCSG concerns

- Both DNS Abuse PDPs involve registrant due-process and privacy and access
- Authentication mechanism, law enforcement access to people's private data
- Prioritization pilot will shape whose issues get Council time

Agenda at a Glance — 09 July 2026

#	Item	Time
1	Administrative Matters (roll call, SOIs, minutes)	5 min
2	Opening Remarks / Projects & Action List Review	10 min
3	Consent Agenda — GNSO Review of GAC Communiqué (ICANN86)	5 min
4	Council Discussion — DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP1 Update (Associated Domain Checks)	25 min
5	Council Discussion — DNS Abuse Mitigation PDP2 Draft Charter (API Access Safeguards)	25 min
6	Council Discussion — Initiation of Prioritization Exercise	25 min
7	Any Other Business (IRT, Review of Reviews, LEA Authentication Input Group)	25 min

ICANN86 Policy Forum Recap — Seville, Spain



8–11 June 2026 · FIBES Centre, Seville

- ICANN's first Public Meeting hosted in Seville; hybrid format
- Focus areas: DNS Abuse mitigation, registration data access, DNS security/resilience, Universal Acceptance, IDNs
- NCSG held policy sessions incl. Joint Session with CPH/CSG and an NCSG Wrap-Up Session
- GNSO Council reviewed the GAC Communiqué arising from ICANN86 — now on the 9 July consent agenda



Item 3: GAC Communiqué Review

- On the Consent Agenda — approved without discussion unless a Councilor pulls it
- NCSG volunteer tip: scan the Communiqué in advance for any GAC advice touching DNS abuse, data access, or authentication — flag to your Councilor if it should be pulled for discussion



ITEMS 4 & 5

DNS Abuse Mitigation

How We Got Here



PDP1 — Associated Domain Checks



What It Covers

- Whether/how registries and registrars should check for 'associated domains' — other domains linked to a known-malicious one (shared registrant data, hosting, name patterns, etc.)
- Charter adopted 15 Jan 2026; Working Group met first at ICANN85 and has been working through charter questions
- 09 Jul update: Council hears WG progress and preliminary recommendations; Q&A opportunity



NCSG Watch Points

- Scope creep: how broadly is “associated” defined?
- Due process for registrants swept up by association, not direct evidence
- Data minimization in any cross-referencing of registrant data
- Appeal/redress mechanism for false positives

PDP2 — Safeguards for Unrestricted API Access



What It Covers

- Safeguards where third parties get broad/unrestricted API access to registry or registrar systems (e.g., bulk lookups, automated queries)
- Deliberately sequenced after PDP1 so it can apply lessons learned; GNSO Support Staff + PDP1 Council liaison prepared the first-cut draft charter (this is problematic procedurally and we will object)
- 09 Jul: Council gets its first substantive briefing on the draft charter and gives initial feedback — NCSG councilors are advised to ask for a drafting team



NCSG Watch Points

- Charter should define “unrestricted” precisely — avoid over-broad rules that chill legitimate research/political campaigns and other uses
- Interplay with other policies
- Ensure charter membership isn’t skewed

PDP1 vs. PDP2 at a Glance

PDP1

Associated Domain Checks

- Status: Active WG, charter since Jan 2026
- Stage: Preliminary recommendations
- Core question: When may providers flag/act on domains linked to known abuse?
- NCSG stake: Due process, false positives, data minimization, access

PDP2

API Access Safeguards

- Status: Draft charter, first Council briefing
- Stage: Pre-initiation — charter not yet adopted
- Core question: What limits apply to bulk/automated API access to registration systems?
- NCSG stake: Scope definition, chilling effects, balanced charter membership

Remedy and data protection across ICANN



What NCSG Raised at ICANN86

- NCSG Policy Committee (8 Jun) flagged Associated Domain Checks (PDP1) as a risk of sweeping in registrants
- ICANN Compliance discussion : there is no baseline global privacy/data-protection standard for registrants — remedy avenues by ICANN exist (patchwork)
- Wrongful-suspension complaints reportedly rose after the 2024 DNS Abuse RAA amendments (~34/yr before → ~60 over the two years since)
- Reseller relationships and language barriers were flagged as extra access-to-remedy gaps, especially in the Global South



Bring to 09 Jul Council

- Push PDP1 WG toward a concrete registrant redress/appeal mechanism, not just detection criteria
- Advocate for a minimum global privacy/data-protection baseline tied to ADC obligations
- Flag reseller and language-barrier access gaps raised by Compliance staff



ITEM 6

Council Prioritization: A New Pilot Mechanism

Initiation of the Prioritization Exercise



Why This Exists

- Council's Action Decision Radar (ADR) flags upcoming decision points — but it doesn't rank or prioritize among them
- At its Jan 2026 Strategic Planning Session, Council agreed to pursue a dedicated prioritization tool
- Staff briefing paper canvassed options; Council Leadership circulated a pilot step-by-step prioritization guide (7 June 2026) blending staff and councilor input
- Framed as a non-binding, adjustable test run — Council agreed to proceed



NCSG Considerations

- Whose criteria decide “priority” — resourcing, urgency, or stakeholder impact?
- Risk that resource-light but rights-sensitive topics get deprioritized
- Push for a checkpoint to evaluate the pilot before it becomes permanent



ITEM 7 — AOB

Authenticating Law Enforcement Requests

Why Authentication Mechanisms Matter to NCSG



The Core Tension

- Faster, verified LEA access speeds legitimate investigations — but a weak or opaque authentication scheme could let bad-faith actors impersonate law enforcement to obtain private registrant data or law enforcement gain access illegitimately
- No jurisdiction-neutral, universally recognized “law enforcement credential” exists today — authentication will likely rely on national/regional accreditation, which varies widely in rigor and human-rights safeguards



Questions for Our Liaison

- Who sits on the Input Group, and does it include civil-society / privacy expertise?
- What human-rights or due-process criteria will authentication standards be measured against?
- How will Input Group output feed back into SSAD Supplemental Recommendations?

Other AOB Items to Note



IGO-INGO Curative Rights IRT

- Public comment item on the Implementation Review Team for IGO-INGO curative rights protections
- Watch for how implementation guidance treats non-commercial and community-registered names



Review of Reviews — Draft Report

- Public comment on the draft paper addressing ICANN's mandated Bylaws reviews (closes per icann.org public comment schedule)
- Relevant to NCSG's long-standing interest in review reform and community accountability

Key Talking Points for NCSG Councilors



DNS Abuse PDP1

Privacy, data minimization, remedy, transparency



DNS Abuse PDP2

Push to shape the draft charter's scope definitions before it is finalized — this is the easiest point of leverage.



Prioritization Pilot

NCSG-relevant but low-resourced items will be protected from deprioritization.



LEA Authentication

Seek civil-society representation on the new Input Group and clarity on how its work ties back to SSAD recommendations.

NCSG Prep Checklist

- ✓ Read the DNSAM PDP1 preliminary recommendations before the WG update, if circulated
- ✓ Skim the PDP2 first-cut draft charter and note any scope concerns to raise
- ✓ Review the pilot prioritization step-by-step guide (circulated 7 June 2026)
- ✓ Check the GAC Communiqué for any advice on DNS abuse, data access, or authentication
- ✓ Confirm who NCSG wants considered for the LEA Authentication Mechanisms Input Group
- ✓ Coordinate with your NCSG Councilor on which AOB items to raise or pull from consent



Questions & Discussion