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<div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false"><div><p data-start="246" data-end="261">Dear Friends,</p>
<p data-start="263" data-end="502">I would like to share what my team of lawyers and I are witnessing every day. We are closely following court proceedings, remaining in continuous touch with law enforcement agencies, and engaging directly with victims and their families.</p>
<p data-start="504" data-end="997">Every day, we see the enormous challenges that arise when victims seek justice. Courts are under pressure to respond swiftly, yet perpetrators exploit loopholes by registering new domains almost overnight. Law enforcement struggles with incomplete or inaccurate WHOIS information, leaving them unable to track abusers effectively. Behind these systemic gaps are real people—parents in tears, young girls forced to abandon school, families whose lives are disrupted by relentless online abuse.</p>
<p data-start="999" data-end="1416">While human rights and privacy must always be respected, we cannot ignore how anonymity is being misused as a shield for cybercriminals. In sensitive cases, such as child abuse, sexual exploitation, and morphing of images, the urgency of accurate and verified information cannot be overstated. Courts are ordering takedowns, yet without stronger obligations on registrars and intermediaries, the cycle simply repeats.</p>
<p data-start="1418" data-end="1627">Our collective responsibility is to find the right balance: protecting fundamental rights while ensuring that victims are not left helpless, and that LEAs and courts have the tools to deliver timely justice. A few suggestions we need to keep in mind while submitting our response: <br><br></p><h2 data-start="404" data-end="454">1. <strong data-start="410" data-end="452">Expanded Law Enforcement Access (RDRS)</strong></h2><p data-start="455" data-end="638"><strong data-start="455" data-end="473">NCSG Position:</strong><br data-start="473" data-end="476">
Law enforcement’s increased use of the RDRS is framed as the normalization of access without safeguards. Mandatory registrar participation is seen as a rights risk.</p><p data-start="640" data-end="1083"><strong data-start="640" data-end="653">Rebuttal:</strong><br data-start="653" data-end="656">
This framing disregards governments’ real legal obligations. Courts hold governments accountable when law enforcement cannot trace cybercriminals. In India alone, thousands of <strong data-start="826" data-end="901">cases involving domain names distributing morphed images of girls</strong> have been filed. Victims’ parents have testified in court while perpetrators exploit anonymity. Registrars’ refusal to comply leaves governments unable to enforce judicial orders.</p><p data-start="1085" data-end="1109"><strong data-start="1085" data-end="1107">Balanced Position:</strong></p><ul data-start="1110" data-end="1418">
<li data-start="1110" data-end="1196">
<p data-start="1112" data-end="1196">Mandatory RDRS participation is essential, but <strong data-start="1159" data-end="1180">tiered safeguards</strong> should apply.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="1197" data-end="1300">
<p data-start="1199" data-end="1300">Urgent categories (child sexual abuse, gender-based crimes, imminent harm) require fast disclosure.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="1301" data-end="1418">
<p data-start="1303" data-end="1418">For non-urgent cases, safeguards such as <strong data-start="1344" data-end="1402">registrant notice, public reporting, and appeal rights</strong> should apply.</p>
</li>
</ul><p data-start="1420" data-end="1497">This balances registrant privacy with victims’ right to dignity and remedy.</p><h2 data-start="1504" data-end="1565">2. <strong data-start="1510" data-end="1563">Urgent Requests for Disclosure (24-Hour Timeline)</strong></h2><p data-start="1566" data-end="1681"><strong data-start="1566" data-end="1584">NCSG Position:</strong><br data-start="1584" data-end="1587">
A 24-hour disclosure timeline lacks legal thresholds and risks misuse by repressive regimes.</p><p data-start="1683" data-end="2046"><strong data-start="1683" data-end="1696">Rebuttal:</strong><br data-start="1696" data-end="1699">
The assumption ignores that <strong data-start="1727" data-end="1784">delays in disclosure directly harm children and women</strong>. Courts order blocking or tracing within hours. Perpetrators reappear the next day with new domains (<em data-start="1886" data-end="1906">example1, example2</em>). Without timely data, law enforcement cannot prevent ongoing abuse. Governments are answerable to courts, not abstract safeguards alone.</p><p data-start="2048" data-end="2072"><strong data-start="2048" data-end="2070">Balanced Position:</strong></p><ul data-start="2073" data-end="2309">
<li data-start="2073" data-end="2201">
<p data-start="2075" data-end="2201">Urgent disclosure timelines must remain, but paired with <strong data-start="2132" data-end="2166">authentication of LEA requests</strong> and <strong data-start="2171" data-end="2198">post-facto audit trails</strong>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="2202" data-end="2309">
<p data-start="2204" data-end="2309">Safeguards should prevent political misuse, but not at the cost of <strong data-start="2271" data-end="2306">child safety and gender justice</strong>.</p>
</li>
</ul><p data-start="2311" data-end="2380">The higher human right is to protect minors from irreversible harm.</p><h2 data-start="2387" data-end="2428">3. <strong data-start="2393" data-end="2426">Accuracy of Registration Data</strong></h2><p data-start="2429" data-end="2571"><strong data-start="2429" data-end="2447">NCSG Position:</strong><br data-start="2447" data-end="2450">
Shorter verification windows risk undermining anonymity; the distinction between contractability and identity is overlooked.</p><p data-start="2573" data-end="2832"><strong data-start="2573" data-end="2586">Rebuttal:</strong><br data-start="2586" data-end="2589">
This overlooks how abusers weaponize <strong data-start="2626" data-end="2657">fake or stolen contact data</strong>. When WHOIS contains unreachable numbers or disposable emails, investigations stall. Courts expect verified contactability. Without it, registrars enable criminal impunity.</p><p data-start="2834" data-end="2858"><strong data-start="2834" data-end="2856">Balanced Position:</strong></p><ul data-start="2859" data-end="3160">
<li data-start="2859" data-end="2952">
<p data-start="2861" data-end="2952">Support <strong data-start="2869" data-end="2903">minimum verification standards</strong> (email + phone validation, periodic rechecks).</p>
</li>
<li data-start="2953" data-end="3049">
<p data-start="2955" data-end="3049">Clarify distinction: accuracy ensures <strong data-start="2993" data-end="3011">contactability</strong>, not mandatory identity disclosure.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="3050" data-end="3160">
<p data-start="3052" data-end="3160">For high-risk categories (financial services, bulk registrations), stricter verification may be justified.</p>
</li>
</ul><p data-start="3162" data-end="3284">Accuracy strengthens both consumer trust and abuse mitigation, while still protecting pseudonymity in low-risk contexts.</p><h2 data-start="3291" data-end="3323">4. <strong data-start="3297" data-end="3321">DNS Abuse Mitigation</strong></h2><p data-start="3324" data-end="3438"><strong data-start="3324" data-end="3342">NCSG Position:</strong><br data-start="3342" data-end="3345">
GAC’s focus on enforcement risks overbroad takedowns and neglects civil society safeguards.</p><p data-start="3440" data-end="3810"><strong data-start="3440" data-end="3453">Rebuttal:</strong><br data-start="3453" data-end="3456">
Governments daily confront systemic abuse: morphed images of girls, financial scams, and child exploitation. <strong data-start="3561" data-end="3609">Anonymity is repeatedly misused as a shield.</strong> Thousands of women have lost dignity and trust in digital spaces. Dismissing enforcement undermines the <strong data-start="3714" data-end="3786">right to dignity, protection from exploitation, and access to remedy</strong> under UDHR/ICCPR/CRC.</p><p data-start="3812" data-end="3836"><strong data-start="3812" data-end="3834">Balanced Position:</strong></p><ul data-start="3837" data-end="4208">
<li data-start="3837" data-end="3927">
<p data-start="3839" data-end="3927">Enforcement must be rapid for <strong data-start="3869" data-end="3924">child abuse, gender violence, and large-scale fraud</strong>.</p>
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<li data-start="3928" data-end="4076">
<p data-start="3930" data-end="4076">Safeguards should exist for small registrants and dissenting voices, including <strong data-start="4009" data-end="4073">appeals, contestation mechanisms, and transparency reporting</strong>.</p>
</li>
<li data-start="4077" data-end="4208">
<p data-start="4079" data-end="4208">ICANN should enable <strong data-start="4099" data-end="4119">joint mechanisms</strong> (governments + NGOs + civil society) to prevent misuse while ensuring proportionality.</p></li></ul><h2 data-start="4215" data-end="4234"><strong data-start="4218" data-end="4232">Conclusion</strong></h2><p data-start="1418" data-end="1627">
</p><div>NCSG’s draft emphasizes registrant rights but <strong data-start="4281" data-end="4335">misses the other half of the human rights equation, </strong>the rights of women, children, and families devastated by unchecked domain abuse. Governments cannot ignore court orders or parental pleas. ICANN must take the <strong data-start="4496" data-end="4513">higher ground</strong>: enable rapid enforcement in abuse cases while embedding due process safeguards. Privacy is vital, but so is dignity, justice, and protection from exploitation.</div></div><br></div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Thanks & Regards,</div><div dir="ltr" data-setdir="false">Shiva Upadhyay</div>
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On Saturday 20 September, 2025 at 01:55:09 am IST, farzaneh badii <farzaneh.badii@gmail.com> wrote:
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<div><div id="yiv3487516010"><div dir="ltr"><div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default">Hi all,</div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default">Here is our second HRIA on GAC communique: <a rel="nofollow noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" href="https://docs.google.com/document/d/1k32oTjH2bg2Gd5hEUExn6BoJZ89HluC3_vPDkks4vfg/edit?tab=t.0">https://docs.google.com/document/d/1k32oTjH2bg2Gd5hEUExn6BoJZ89HluC3_vPDkks4vfg/edit?tab=t.0</a> </div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default">Please comment so that we finalize it and submit it to them and bring it up during our GAC meeting.</div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default">We are aiming to finalize by Wednesday next week. </div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default"><br></div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default">Best regards, </div><div style="font-family:arial, sans-serif;" class="yiv3487516010gmail_default"><br></div><br clear="all"></div><div><div dir="ltr" class="yiv3487516010gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><font face="verdana, sans-serif">Farzaneh </font></div></div></div></div></div>
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