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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D">Helpful, David and Danielle!<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D">One calculation seems to be missing. Admittedly it may seem like a minute and boring one, but what about the decision to change the IANA functions operator? What
kind of a Community Mechanism vote would be required to stop ICANN from ignoring a IANA Functions Review that called for a change in IANA provider for names?
<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D">--MM<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a name="_MailEndCompose"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif;color:#1F497D"><o:p> </o:p></span></a></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif">From:</span></b><span style="font-size:11.0pt;font-family:"Calibri",sans-serif"> David Post [mailto:david.g.post@gmail.com]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Thursday, August 20, 2015 12:15 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Mueller, Milton L <milton.mueller@pubpolicy.gatech.edu><br>
<b>Cc:</b> NCSG-DISCUSS@LISTSERV.SYR.EDU; Brenden Kuerbis <bkuerbis@internetgovernance.org>; Danielle Kehl <kehl@newamerica.org><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Another must-read about the CCWG accountability proposal<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br>
My colleague Danielle Kehl, in connection with another paper we're doing on the transition and the accountability proposals, has come up with a very useful spreadsheet that supplements Brenden's earlier analysis of the voting allocations (at
<a href="http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/11/ccwg-community-mechanism-threatens-to-upset-icann-balance/#comment-40415">
http://www.internetgovernance.org/2015/08/11/ccwg-community-mechanism-threatens-to-upset-icann-balance/#comment-40415</a> ).
<br>
<br>
You can access the spreadsheet here: <br>
<br>
<a href="https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OqhS0LJmTQZpqnnKf8kVCHWW_1KH_6YMEWT815Rr27w/edit#gid=0">https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1OqhS0LJmTQZpqnnKf8kVCHWW_1KH_6YMEWT815Rr27w/edit#gid=0</a>
<br>
<br>
We were trying to figure out: how do the different voting allocation schemes affect the kinds of coalitions among the different groups that are necessary to take actions (or to veto actions by others)? Here's Danielle's description of how she put the spreadsheet
together:<br>
<br>
"At the top I copied the chart from Brenden's original analysis, and then using the percentages calculated the minimum number of SOs and ACs in various combinations that it would take to get 75% for the high threshold community powers like recalling the entire
board or approving a fundamental bylaw (and then what it would take to get a 25% coalition to block one of those actions) as well as the 66% required to reject a budget/operating plan or veto a change to the standard bylaw (and again, the 34% coalition you'd
need to get to block one of those actions). The colors aim to make it a little bit easier to parse which of the voting structures we're looking at (Current Proposal, Alternative #1, Alternative #2, and Alternative #3). I called out the specific ACs in the
current proposal since they're apportioned different votes; everywhere else I just use SO or AC generically since they're all weighted equally, although obviously the ALAC and GAC are the ones of greater concern."<br>
<br>
Standing alone it doesn't necessarily indicate which proposal is the best one, but it should hopefully clarify the various positions on that question -<br>
<br>
David<br>
<br>
*******************************<br>
David G Post - Senior Fellow, Open Technology Institute/New America Foundation<br>
blog (Volokh Conspiracy) <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post">
http://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-post<br>
</a>book (Jefferson's Moose) <a href="http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n%A0%A0%A0%A0%A0%A0%A0">
http://tinyurl.com/c327w2n </a><br>
music <a href="http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic%A0">http://tinyurl.com/davidpostmusic
</a>publications etc. <a href="http://www.davidpost.com /">http://www.davidpost.com
</a><br>
******************************* <o:p></o:p></p>
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