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Absolutely right, and I think we need a lot of work on new models
with teeth, if we are going to work towards more multi-stakeholder
models in international governance. I think many are concerned
about bias in US jurisdiction, and while I like the bias towards
free speech, one cannot deny that a more international model would
be more fair. Question is how to develop one that works.<br>
kind regards<br>
SP<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2015-05-05 11:49, farzaneh badii
wrote:<br>
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<div dir="ltr">Effective international court is a very nice
concept but international courts and tribunals have always been
a soft law mechanism with no real judicial power. so we will go
back to square one! I don't understand why we would need an
international oversight if we can legally hold ICANN (the rule
making part of ICANN) accountable in the court of law in the US
? some may say there are accessibility issues, well
accessibility issues also exist in international mechanisms! In
some international courts only states can file suits against
states. I find the Independent Review Panel more effective than
an international court !</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 5 May 2015 at 13:28, Stephanie
Perrin <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca"
target="_blank">stephanie.perrin@mail.utoronto.ca</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000"> I agree too. For an
organization the size of ICANN, one ombudsman to cover a
number of accountabilities should suffice. On the other
hand, I do agree that ICANN needs an international appeal
mechanism for its decisions (ie a Court or Tribunal), I
don't think that the Board should be the only appeal
mechanism, but that is another matter entirely.<span
class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
Stephanie Perrin</font></span>
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<div>On 2015-05-05 10:55, Seun Ojedeji wrote:<br>
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<p dir="ltr">I tend to agree with Sam on this one,
especially the pondering questions raised in
relation to international oversight.</p>
<p dir="ltr">Cheers!<br>
sent from Google nexus 4<br>
kindly excuse brevity and typos.</p>
<div class="gmail_quote">On 5 May 2015 17:15, "Sam
Lanfranco" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:lanfran@yorku.ca" target="_blank">lanfran@yorku.ca</a>>
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<div><big><small>Carlos, <br>
<br>
Thanks for your comment and flagging the
issues of an outside international
oversight body, the ombudsmans
(ombudspersons?) office, and the
possibility of another office within
ICANN to address “these strategic
challenges”. Here are some quick
comments from the small to the big in
terms of challenges here. <br>
<br>
In terms of the choice between the
ombudsman and some other new ICANN
office, my personal view is to prefer
the ombudsman, and not just because it
would be less expensive in a time of
serious ICANN budget constraints
(another challenge). I find it hard to
envision a new ICANN office dealing with
DNS strategic challenges where that
office would not become a lightening rod
for a wide variety of external forces
interested in issues that would amount
to pressure for ICANN scope creep. As
well, administrative theory and evidence
suggests that a new office, in and of
itself, would risk scope creep within
its own work agenda, to bolster its
existence, especially in times of
constrained budgets. <br>
<br>
As for an international (outside)
oversight body, for me the core issues
are: (a) what principles are to be
upheld; (b) keeping clear what should be
inside the ICANN DNS system remit; and
(c) what within the DNS system should be
addressed elsewhere. The primary role of
an oversight body is to hold an entity
accountable to its remit. How does that
get defined in a way that an oversight
body: (i) doesn’t foster scope creep by
asking ICANN to be accountable for the
wrong things, and (ii) helps re-direct
DNS concerns (especially content and
intellectual property issues) to other
appropriate venues? <br>
<br>
Sam L.<br>
</small><i><small><br>
On 05/05/2015 11:35 AM, Carlos A.
Afonso wrote:<br>
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<pre><big><i><small>Dear Sam,
Powerful message indeed. ICANN needs an outside international oversight
body which would, among other tasks, decidedly help in tackling these
strategic challenges.
But we (NCSG?) seem to agree on this oversight being reduced to an
office within ICANN. What would be the real difference between this
office and the ombudsman? My answer: the ombudsman is much cheaper.
fraternal regards
--c.a.</small></i></big></pre>
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-- <br>
<div class="gmail_signature">Farzaneh </div>
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